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Problem of "consciousness-body" in the analytical philosophy of mind

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Philosophy is often concerned with the most general questions about the nature of things: what does it mean to have true knowledge? What is the nature of beauty? What makes an act virtuous? Such questions can be asked in relation to many specific areas, with the result that there are entire areas of philosophy devoted to art, science, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and so on. The philosophy of mind, in turn, deals with rather general questions about the nature of mental phenomena: what is the nature of consciousness, thought, perception and sensory experience?

These philosophical questions about the nature of the phenomenon must be distinguished from similar-sounding questions that tend to concern empirical research, such as in experimental psychology, which depend decisively on the results of direct observation. Empirical psychologists are, by and large, concerned with discovering random facts about people and animals – things that turn out to be true when they might turn out to be false. For example, they might

find that a certain chemical is released when and only when people are frightened, or that a certain area of the brain is activated when and only when people are in pain or thinking about their loved ones. The philosophical question about the relationship between consciousness and the brain is this: is consciousness something different from the brain, even if related to it, or is it the brain? Are feelings, perceptions, thoughts, sensations, and desires something that goes on in addition to all the physical processes in the brain, or are they themselves some of these processes?

Since the last quarter of the 20th century, analytic philosophy has been preoccupied with two key questions: the first concerns the theory of reference, and the second concerns the theory of consciousness, whose direct interest is the mind-body problem. There are many other philosophies of consciousness, such as phenomenology, transcendental philosophy, some aspects of Indian philosophy, and others, but only the analytical philosophy of consciousness will be considered below.

The mind-body problem as such arises in modern times as an ontological opposition of the mental world and the world of physical phenomena, and is the result of the development of European philosophy. The positive result of the articulation of this problem was the development of modern natural science, because if matter and mind exist differently, and we can attribute an attribute of attraction to matter, then we can explore it completely in mechanistic terms without involving supernatural entities.

Statement of the mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is fundamental; raises not only the question of how consciousness relates to the world of physical phenomena, but also the question of what generally exists and what does not, is there any heterogeneity among the whole variety of phenomena, or vice versa, everything that exists is homogeneous, and belongs to the same nature. In addition, the mind-body problem is a naturalistic problem, which consists in constructing the most adequate naturalistic ontology. Within the frame-

work of naturalistic ontology, consciousness is a natural phenomenon, but such a phenomenon, the nature of which, perhaps, is different.

One of the most important principles of the naturalistic approach is the principle of the causal closure of the physical, which is shared by most modern analytical philosophers. It means that if a physical event has a sufficient cause, then this cause is only physical. When constructing an ontology, it is necessary to take into account the causal criterion of existence – there is something that is built into the causal or causal series of events. Thus, the study of consciousness must address the problem of mental causation, of how consciousness can cause some physical events, must take into account some of the characteristics of a naturalistic explanation: minimal explanation, consistency with empirical data, a ban on supernatural and transcendental phenomena.

The problem of mind-body, contrary to conventional notions, is a complex problem and includes the following questions:

- Is consciousness physical?
- Is consciousness generated by the brain?
- Why is the work of the brain accompanied by consciousness?
- The problem of other consciousnesses;
- The problem of characterization of consciousness;
- Is consciousness supervented on the brain?

How is consciousness generated by the brain?

- Reducibility of consciousness;
- The problem of the unity of consciousness;
- Multiple realizability of consciousness;
- Communication of consciousness and cognitive abilities;
- Consciousness and memory;
- Consciousness and language;
- Consciousness in animals;
- The evolutionary significance of consciousness;
- Consciousness and self-awareness;

- Consciousness and introspection;
- Consciousness and attention, etc.

At the moment, there is no theory that would contain explicit answers to all these questions, but the positivity of considering the problem as the above.

The problem of mind-body is closely related to other important problems, such as:

- The problem of personal identity;
- The problem of free will;
- The problem of moral responsibility;
- Bioethical problems;
- The problem of artificial intelligence;
- The question of the nature of causal relationships;
- Existence criteria, etc.

Refinement of the concept of consciousness. When moving towards an explanation of consciousness, the question of the definition of consciousness inevitably arises. The main difficulties in defining consciousness are the confusion of ordinary and special types of usage, the exceptional importance of consciousness, polysemantics, "liberalism" or "dictatorship" in the definition of the term. The ordinary use of the term "consciousness" occurs when, for example, one is said to be a conscious person, or mental terms are used in everyday speech. The special use of this term is associated with a certain theoretical load, and the solution of certain problems, where the definition of consciousness plays a significant role. In addition, each person has his own certain intuitions about what consciousness is, because he is directly an expert on his own consciousness.

The critical importance of consciousness lies in the fact that when predicates such as "someone is conscious" or "someone is sufficiently conscious" are attributed to a person, that person is considered to be a person and may be morally responsible for his actions, or, for example, that he cannot be disconnected from the life support apparatus.

When studying issues of consciousness, it often happens that even within special areas where the term "consciousness" is used, it is used in different

meanings, which most sharply shows the problem of polysemantics. "Liberalism" or "dictatorship" in the definition of consciousness can be demonstrated by the following examples. Let's say that consciousness is the ability to discriminate, but we can say that insects have this ability to some extent, and then insects have consciousness.

Those liberal definitions, while truthful, often cover too many phenomena and are redundant. Dictatorship in the definition of consciousness is the opposite circumstance, when, for example, consciousness is associated with the ability to speak, rationality. Then only an adult, healthy, educated person has consciousness, which does not allow some people, or animals that have consciousness, to have it.

The special use of the concept of consciousness appears in analytic philosophy in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, consciousness is considered as cognitive consciousness - a set of conditionally "higher" cognitive functions associated with speech, thinking, memory, information integration, prediction, modeling, etc., and it is clear that not all functions that are usually associated with consciousness eventually become conscious.

However, it is phenomenal consciousness that is responsible for the emergence of the difficult problem of consciousness, i.e. correlation of phenomenal consciousness and cognitive consciousness. A broad definition for phenomenal consciousness is that some mental state, event or process is conscious if it is phenomenal and/or has a phenomenal aspect and/or there are phenomenal concepts in its description. If these conditions are not met in relation to some mental state, event or process, then there is no reason to consider it conscious. At the same time, this emphasizes the intuitive fact that not the entire world of mental phenomena is conscious. In order to clarify the concept of phenomenal consciousness, the following characteristics are discussed in the literature devoted to this problem:

- Qualitativeness;
- Intentionality;

- Subjectivity and privacy;
- Lack of spatial extension;
- Inner nature;
- Direct acquaintance or immediate access;
- Infallibility;
- Simplicity;
- Ineffability;
- Awareness;
- Attendirovannost;
- Connectedness or integration - diachronic and synchronic.

Perhaps the most difficult biological question of all may be how and why electrochemical neural activity in the brain generates subjective conscious experiences such as the redness of red or the soreness of pain. Neuroscientists track how light hitting the retina is converted into electrical impulses (neural impulses) that travel through the visual thalamus to the visual cortex and finally culminate in activity in speech-related areas, causing us to say "red." But how a sensation like blushing red results from sensory processing is completely puzzling. It is also not clear why these experiences have phenomenal characteristics that can only be directly accessed by the subject having the experience. Philosopher David Chalmers called this the "hard problem" of consciousness [5]. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness or the "character of subjective experience" is called qualia. The difficulty with qualia lies in their subjective nature: they exist only when viewed from within.

They cannot be objectively detected or compared like any other properties measured in the natural sciences. The subjectivity of qualia allows us to imagine hypothetical situations that philosophers discuss in thought experiments. For example, we can assume without any contradiction that a person with "inverted" qualia who, seeing red, has the qualia you would have when seeing green, and vice versa. In another thought experiment, we can imagine a philosophical zombie that has all the cognitive and perceptual abilities that we do, but does not

have any phenomenal experience. For us, the existence of qualia is real, and subjectively, the qualia of hunger, pain, and perception are central to our existence. The fact that we can imagine mindless possibilities like philosophical zombies suggests that our conceptualization of qualia may still be premature.

Also, a key characteristic of consciousness is intentionality, or direction, i.e. he has an item. The question here is whether all states of consciousness are intentional.

Subjectivity and privacy are expressed in the fact that other consciousnesses are closed to the observer, access is carried out from the first person, and, accordingly, lead to this problem. Infallibility, simplicity and inexpressibility, direct acquaintance or direct access are related characteristics that emphasize the special cognitive relationship in which the subject of experience is with his conscious state. There is an idea that since consciousness is subjective and private, then a person has direct access to the state of consciousness from the first person, and this access is such that even when, for example, a person sees not a real object, but an illusion, the perception itself is in a sense fact. Moreover, inner experiences cannot be observed from a third-person perspective. Attendirovanost indicates that any state of consciousness is grasped, and this requires attention and memory.

Connectedness and integration lies in the fact that in any conscious state there is a connectedness of elements that has a certain duration. The interpretation of these properties, which provides a working definition of consciousness, will lead to a refined definition of consciousness and further construction of a theory of consciousness.

Main difficulties in solving the mind-body problem. The main difficulties underlying the mind-body problem are, firstly, in posing the problem and finding a working definition of consciousness. Despite the seeming naivety of this problem, in relation to such fundamental problems as consciousness-body, their formulation and articulation is an essential part of them. Second, there is a significant asymmetry between third-person access and first-person access. All nat-

ural phenomena, in any case of the macrocosm, have access from a third person, they have intersubjectivity. This allows you to make judgments about them of the same type, make sure of them by means of the verification method. The mode of access to consciousness is the mode of access from the first person. The first knowledge about consciousness, the knowledge of the most conscious person about it. Such asymmetry in cognitive access leads to the formulation of a gap in explanation, i.e. no fact about consciousness follows from any facts about the physical and/or functional organization of an organism or system. It is also difficult to study the fact that when cognizing something, including consciousness, this is done with the help of consciousness, thus consciousness acquires a certain transcendental status.

Among the main strategies for solving the mind-body problem are:

- Pessimistic;
- Physicalistic;
- Anti-physicalist;
- "Other".

The pessimistic approach, or mysterianism, is a philosophical position advocated by K. McGinn and other philosophers who express considerations similar to him, suggesting that the problem of consciousness cannot be solved by people. [eighteen]

Physicalist and anti-physicalist strategies for solving the problem emphasize how the problem of body consciousness is understood among philosophers, namely as, for the most part, a refinement of the ontological status of consciousness. The ontological thesis of physicalism is that everything that exists is either physical, in the literal sense, or derived, grounded, rooted, based, or supervenient on the physical. Antiphysicalism, in turn, is the opposite thesis.

The word "physicalism" is often used as a synonym for "materialism", but the former term is preferred, since traditionally "matter" was associated with "substratum", while physicalism is associated with science, which occupies the highest status in the system of knowled. As different versions appeared in physi-

calism, a need arose to clarify the meanings of the concepts of “physics”, “physical”, “physical object”, etc. Problems immediately arose.

The fact is that philosophers use the ordinary idea of the "physical", which does not coincide with the ideas of physicists. And physicists are still not clear about many things, for example, whether the property of gravity is material. In addition, in their environment, "physics" is understood as the study of not only micro-phenomena, but also ways of studying them, including properties that are not spatio-temporal at all. There is also an agnostic aspect in the conjugation of philosophical physicalism with physics. Usually, not the current, but potential, future physics is meant, but no one knows what it will be like.

The remaining “others” are named so because, on the one hand, it is not clear which ontology they gravitate towards, and, on the other hand, they can be classified as both physicalist and antiphysicalist.

Pessimistic approach. Mysterianism. According to C. McGinn's mysterianism, although there is a naturalistic solution to the mind-body problem, we are cognitively closed to a natural solution to this problem in principle, because we, as human beings, have limited cognitive abilities. [19] The idea that the human brain is organized into different modules, each of which performs different functions, underlies Chomsky's theory of the existence of an innate language module [6] Agreeing with this modular hypothesis, McGinn argues that a person most likely does not have a module for solving a problem of consciousness, just as, for example, a dog does not have a module or ability to solve a mathematical problem. McGinn writes that the nature of the psychophysical connection has a full and not mysterious explanation in a certain science, but this science is inaccessible to us in principle. He states this principle as follows: Brain type M is cognitively closed to property P (or theory T) if and only if the concept formation procedures available to M cannot be extended to understanding P (or understanding T).

Physicalist strategies. Eliminative physicalism, reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism can be distinguished among physicalist strategies in solving the problem.

Eliminative physicalism. Descartes famously challenged much of what we take for granted, but he insisted that for the most part we can be sure of the content of our own mind. Eliminativists go further than Descartes on this point, as they dispute the existence of various mental states that Descartes took for granted [2] However, eliminativism does not pursue exclusively nihilistic goals. Modern versions of eliminative physicalism argue that our ordinary, common sense understanding of psychological states and processes is profoundly flawed, and that some or all of our ordinary notions of mental states will have no place at any level of analysis in a complex and accurate description of consciousness. In other words, it is the view that certain intuitive mental states, such as beliefs and desires, do not exist. To back up this claim, eliminativists usually make several central and controversial claims, which we will explore below. It is believed that many of the arguments presented below can be generalized to other mental concepts, especially to other propositional attitudes.

The standard argument for eliminativism begins with Sellars' thesis that our understanding of mentality can be derived not from direct access to the internal processes of our own minds, but from basic theoretical schemas, primary data in experience [23]

Since this position states that we use a certain theory when using mental idioms, it later became the mainstay for the development of eliminativism as such. Feyerabend was a supporter of the idea that the mental concepts of folk psychology could be replaced by more accurate physiological ones [12] Like many of his contemporaries, he argued that the mental concepts of common sense are not essentially physical, and thus any physicalism already contains a negation of mental processes or states, as they are understood by common sense.

The problem lies in the conflict between folk psychology, which is a collection of ordinary ideas about the mental, and scientific concepts. Often, the

concepts of folk psychology do not have specific analogues in the scientific language, because they arise before science, in principle, begins to deal with them, and subsequently become inapplicable, similarly, for example, to the concepts of phlogiston or miasm. The ordinary understanding of consciousness is based on the perception of it from the first person and the extrapolation of one's private ideas to other people, so instead of an intersubjective premise, there is only a subjective one.

Daniel Dennett accurately expressed the disadvantage of this approach, suggesting that no one has ever experienced pain [10] The fact is that the very concept of "pain" is too general and in some ways even abstract. It includes all possible physical and mental pains with all possible variations of intensity and duration in time. It turns out that when someone says that he is in pain, then in fact this person does not say anything. We can only guess from the context of the situation or through clarifying questions about what the person is really experiencing. Thus, the ordinary understanding of pain is a very crude and unreliable description of neurological processes. This reasoning can be generalized to other mental states.

The second component of eliminative materialism is the thesis that folk psychology is profoundly mistaken about the ontological nature of consciousness. Eliminativists argue that the central tenets of folk psychology fundamentally misrepresent cognitive processes; consequently, the postulates of folk psychology play no role in a serious scientific theory of mind, because the postulates do not single out anything real.

Like dualists, eliminative materialists insist that ordinary mental states cannot be reduced to or identified with neurological events or processes. However, unlike the dualists, they argue that consciousness contains nothing more than what is going on in the brain. The reason for the irreducibility of mental states is not that they are non-physical; rather, it is because the mental states described in common-sense psychology do not actually exist.

Paul and Patricia Churchland, who are among the main proponents of eliminativism, believe that some classes of mental states defined in folk psychology have no referents and no neurobiological basis [7]. They suggest applying a scientific-critical eye to what we think is "common sense" and revisiting folk psychology in a similar way to folk medicine and folk biology.

The theoretical postulates of folk psychology need radical ontological changes, similar to, for example, the transition from demonology to modern theories of mental disorder. Using eliminativism, in the same way that we have come to understand that demons do not exist, eliminativists also argue that various folk psychological concepts such as belief will eventually be found to be meaningless, inconsistent with anything that actually exists. Since there is nothing that has the causal and semantic properties that we attribute to beliefs (and many other mental states), it turns out that in fact there are no such things.

Reductive physicalism. Reductive physicalism is based on reduction, obtaining strict intertheoretical laws, for example, physical and chemical ones, when chemical phenomena can be reduced to physical ones by obtaining certain laws. If such laws are available, derivable, then the reductive explanation is fulfilled. There are three main areas of reductive physicalism: behaviorism, identity theory, illusionism.

Behaviorism. Behaviorism is the thesis according to which the mental, i.e. accordingly, and consciousness, there is no internal nature, and all information about the mental can be reduced to a disposition to behavior, or directly to behavior. J. Watson is recognized as the founder of the behavioral school of psychology. According to him, it is observation that should be the true method of psychology, and human behavior should be the object of observation [26].

He rejects introspection, which is unable to provide the objective data necessary for psychological experiment, and postulates that psychology should be based not on introspection, but on observation. He believes that all human behavior can be explained as a set of responses to stimuli to which a person is exposed. Thus, Watson uses the stimulus-response model to explain every men-

tal phenomenon. For him, thinking, which is called mental, but in fact is subvocal speech, is nothing but physical. It is argued that every mental phenomenon can be reduced to physical states and processes.

Since the inner mental life and consciousness are not accessible to observation "from a third person", the shift in the focus of empirical study to external, observed behavior made it possible to put psychology on a par with other natural sciences, at least methodologically. However, at the same time, she retained a certain comparative independence of her subject.

At the same time, the only thing that, according to behaviorists, previously separated psychology from the natural sciences, was the commitment to the idea of phenomenal consciousness; therefore, its use in psychological descriptions was banned. Psychology, from this point of view, should not describe internal mental subjective states or processes, but formulate laws that connect external observable stimuli that affect the organism, and the external, observable reactions of this organism to these stimuli. At the moment, the behaviorist theory of consciousness is not popular, but it is important to consider that behaviorism is deeply rooted in physicalist ontologies.

Identity theory. The classical identity theory is in many ways the heir of behaviorism. She argues that the states and processes of consciousness are identical to the states and processes of the brain, but strictly speaking, it is not necessary to consider that consciousness is identical to the brain. Consider experiencing pain, or seeing something, or a mental image: the identity theory is that these experiences are brain processes, not just correlated with brain processes. The Australian philosopher J. Smart suggested that each mental state is identical to the physical state in the same way as, for example, lightning episodes are identical to electric discharge episodes [24].

Here the identity is presented as an asymmetric relation, for lightning is a discharge of electricity, but electricity is not a discharge of lightning. It is argued that mental events are composed of lower level physical events, and any mental state such as pain or propositional attitude can be reduced to a lower level physi-

cal event. However, the comparison with lightning carries what many philosophers consider an implausible implication.

Although every instance of lightning is an example of the same type of physical state, an electrical discharge, it is doubtful that every instance of a mental phenomenon is also an example of the same type of physical state, i.e. firing of certain neurons in the brain. For it seems possible that two people could have brains made up of slightly different substances and yet share the same beliefs or different mental states. This problem of the so-called multiple realization was the main objection to the identity theory.

Other formulations of the identity theory were proposed by such philosophers as G. Feigl and D. Armstrong. Feigl, relying on Frege's semantics, proposed the following type of identification: for any mental state M, there exists some state of the brain B, such that M and B are quantitatively identical [11]. I.e. identification is made not by type (general principle), but by signs (individual elements), they are often called tokens. Thus, a mental state can be realized differently in different nervous systems, thereby solving the problem of multiple realization.

D. Armstrong put forward a broader theory, which, in his opinion, is also empirical, i.e. corresponds to basic intuitions and does not contradict the data of science [3]. This theory is called the materialism of the central state. According to this concept, pain is not just a state of the brain, but a state of the central nervous system, and any mental states are identical to the states of the central nervous system. Thus consciousness is explained as a physical phenomenon.

The main argument in favor of the identity theory is that it provides a kind of economy in describing the different kinds of things in the world, and also unifies causal statements: mental events enter into causal relationships with physical ones, because ultimately they themselves are physical events.

Identity theory of the classical type, i.e. type identity is also not popular at the moment, however, it has been transformed into functionalism, which is cur-

rently one of the most popular approaches to the problem of consciousness, having received the status of the philosophical foundation of cognitive science.

Illusionism. Illusionists deny the reality of phenomenal consciousness in the sense that they deny that any of our mental states actually have "genuine" phenomenal properties. For illusionists, strictly speaking, there are no mental states in living beings. Illusionists may agree that the mental states that we call conscious states have some quasi-phenomenal properties that are just physical/functional properties of brain states that are perfectly tracked by our introspective means but incorrectly characterized as phenomenal by our introspective representations. In this sense, for any phenomenal proposition, such as, for example, "I am in pain right now," illusionists can interpret this proposition in such a way that it often remains true, provided that the concept of pain used here is interpreted as referring to a quasi-phenomenal state that has quasi-phenomenal property, but they claim that no one is phenomenal.

For illusionists, none of our mental states generate phenomenal properties. For this reason, phenomenal consciousness does not need to be explained, since it does not exist, only quasi-phenomenal consciousness exists, and this in turn is not problematic for physicalism. All that needs to be explained is why we seem to be phenomenally conscious.

K. Frankish, a supporter of illusionism, believes that illusionism replaces the difficult problem of consciousness with the problem of illusion - the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so strong [16]. This means that illusionists must offer a theory to explain why we tend to believe that we are phenomenally conscious. This theory may appeal to built-in, hard-wired features of our introspective mechanisms, to some kind of fallacious inference mechanism, or to a combination of the features of our introspective mechanisms and philosophical (mostly Cartesian) prejudices.

Non-reductive physicalism. Contrary to the popular belief that physicalists are largely reductionist, most physicalist theories are non-reductive. It is such, if only because, many physicalists believe that the thesis of the multiple realizabil-

ity of consciousness is fulfilled. If consciousness can be realized on different physical carriers, then there is no direct identity between consciousness and physical systems, which means that there is no reduction, as well as the deducibility of strict intertheoretical connecting laws.

The attempt to declare subjective experience as such non-existent could not satisfy everyone, since it strongly contradicts common sense. Therefore, concepts were developed in parallel, trying to combine the irreducibility of the mental to the physical with strict materialism. Basic non-reductive strategies: anomalous monism, realization physicalism, supervenience physicalism.

Anomalous monism. Anomalous monism is a type of property dualism that suggests that the ontological difference between mind and matter lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter. Property dualism combines the thesis that mental phenomena are strictly irreducible to physical phenomena with the denial that mind and body are discrete substances.

For the anomalous monist, the plausibility of property dualism stems from the fact that while mental states, events, and processes have genuine causal power, the causal relationships they enter into with physical entities cannot be explained by appeal to the fundamental laws of nature. This doctrine of the relationship between mind and body was first substantiated by D. Davidson, although its roots in the Western philosophical tradition go back at least to Spinoza [8]. There is a consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind that anomalous monism is a failed theory.

Realization physicalism. Most modern physicalist theories of consciousness are implementation physicalist and are often also called functionalist. The thesis of functionalism is that consciousness and mental processes can be characterized by their causal role, and in this case consciousness can be understood as a functional state, or as an implementation, relatively speaking, of some rule. There are many types of functionalism, such as machine, psychofunctionalism and analytical functionalism.

One of the sources of modern functionalism was the identity theory. It had one problem that was immediately highlighted in it, it was the lack of the possibility of multiple implementations. This problem was a serious argument against the classical theory of identities by type, but after reformulation into the theory of identities by token, this problem was solved.

This theory became the basis for the functionalist solution to the problem of multiple realization, which lies in the fact that mental states are functional states that are realized in different materials, i.e. states are defined by their functions. However, unlike behaviorism, mental states, a mental state does not constitute behavior, it is only its cause. In this sense, the position of functionalism is more intuitive.

Machine functionalism emerged from early AI theory. Alan Turing stated in his 1950 paper that the question of whether machines can think can be seen as the question of whether it is theoretically possible for a machine with a finite number of states, provided with a large but limited table of instructions, or program, to provide answers to questions in such a way as to trick the independent questioner into thinking that she is a human being [25].

This test, which he called "The Imitation Game", later became known as the Turing test. Turing himself believed that such a machine is quite realizable. Thus, he identified thoughts with the states of the system, revealed solely by their role in the production of subsequent internal states or explicit output data. This view is largely consistent with modern functionalist theories.

At the heart of modern machine functionalism is a computer metaphor, which was primarily associated with the activities of H. Putnam [21].

Its essence is that consciousness is like a computer program that is implemented or implemented on computer hardware. Putnam points out that, unlike token identity theory, the issue of identity is not a matter of a priori reasoning, but an empirical fact established by scientists.

His justification strategy relies on the fact that the hypothesis is more plausible according to everything we know about how machines and the brain

function. According to Patman, it would be more plausible to identify the sensation of pain not with the very predisposition to some particular behavior, i.e. its disposition, but some brain state or functional state that explains this predisposition. By this he formulates the position of functionalism in relation to behaviorism, i.e. it follows that pain is not pain behavior, but its cause, which is a functional state.

Later, in the field of cognitive science, one of the most common approaches to the problem of consciousness, called connectionism, was formed. It is a modern alternative to machine physicalism and is a metascientific principle according to which mental phenomena can be described as interacting networks of simple elements. These elements can represent neurons, and the connections between them can represent synapses. According to connectionism, any mental state can be represented as an n-dimensional vector of activation of neural network elements, memory, in turn, is created by modifying the strength of the connection between neurons. Connectionism, unlike machine functionalism, involves a deeper implementation of the machine, or neural network. It doesn't need an instruction table, thus connectionism is related to machine learning and deep learning and justifies them.

Against this approach of explaining mental states, philosophers such as J. Fodor pointed out that connectionism cannot explain the language of thought, in addition, connectionism rejects folk psychology, and contradicts its predictive power, which we rely on in everyday life [13]. Despite a number of objections, at the moment connectionism is one of the most developed approaches, it has led to many discoveries in the field of cognitive science and related areas.

Another kind of functionalism is analytic or causal physicalism, which, unlike machine physicalism, which Patman himself abandoned, is still optimal for many philosophers. The main representatives of analytic functionalism are D. Lewis and D. Armstrong. The idea that the functional roles played by mental properties could be defined in a different way came to Lewis in the course of his analysis of the proposals of science. Based on the assumption of F.

Ramsey that obscure terms that are the subject of ontology and metaphysics can be explained using clear terms of scientific theories, in his 1970 work, D. Lewis substantiated the point of view that terms that exist only within theories are implicitly determined by the scientific theories themselves, thus the meaning of the term is determined by the type of its use in the theory, by reference to the causal role in it [9]. To avoid defining mental states in terms of other mental states, resulting in an infinite regression, Lewis uses a procedure that defines the meaning of mental terms using folk psychology. It lies in the fact that the set of ordinary ideas about the causal relationships between mental states, stimuli, and reactions, contained in one sentence, is a theory that determines the meaning of mental terms. The main thesis against analytic functionalism is that a theory of the mind that is based only on generalizations of folk psychology can include erroneous elements. Given the holism of Ramsey's proposals, which consists in the fact that psychological concepts are defined by means of all ordinary ideas at once, one false component is enough for a theory to become false.

Another type of objection to functionalism, in particular machine functionalism or connectionism, is called problems of imitation, which is that when a state is simulated, it may not be. These include the thought experiment known as the "Chinese brain", proposed by N. Block [4]. Block proposes to use the population of China as an emulation of the functional organization of the human brain, as a collection of neurons. Every Chinese is given a radio capable of receiving and transmitting a signal. If a functional state is created in this system, then the Chinese people as a whole will have consciousness, or at least mental properties. This conclusion is counterintuitive, and indicates that the functionalist definition of consciousness can endow it with something that, according to basic intuitions, cannot have it. The answer to this may be the assertion that such a system as a whole is indeed conscious.

Also related to the problems of imitation is the problem of inverted qualia. The idea of this argument against physicalism is first encountered in the work of J. Locke, where he says that certain qualitative states can be caused in different

people in different ways. [17] Block demonstrates this thesis with the following example: the sensations of red and green change places from the inside, but for one person “red” means red, and for another, green. The functional role of qualia in both cases may be the same, but the qualitative, internal properties of the experience are different.

John Searle, in his famous Chinese room thought experiment, points out the difference between syntax, form, and meaning, i.e. semantics [22]. He believes that the program is only syntax, while consciousness includes semantics, and that syntax alone is not enough for semantics. Thus, the simulation of consciousness is not its repetition in the full sense. Also through this argument, he argues that strong AI is impossible. The mental experiment is that a person is in a room, and he has instructions for translating one character into another, an observer who knows Chinese transmits characters to the room in such a way that a meaningful answer is obtained by means of the instruction. D. Dennett's answer to this argument is that not each element is understood separately, but the system as a whole. Supervenient physicalism. In addition, supervenient physicalism stands out among non-reductive physicalist theories. Unlike anomalous monism and implementation physicalism, this approach does not have a clear idea of what the relationship is between mental and physical, consciousness and brain. Here, consciousness can be attributed not only to the properties of the functional organization of the brain, but also to some of its biological properties.

There are many kinds of supervenient physicalism. One of them is the hard nonreductive physicalism. Typically, realization physicalism and supervenience physicalism are referred to as type B physicalism. there is a gap in explanation between consciousness and matter, it should not lead to an ontological failure, i.e. how mind and matter exist. They believe that it is possible to eliminate this epistemological gap.

Arguments for and against physicalism. The main argument in favor of the physicalist approach to solving the mind-body problem is that if the thesis of the causal closure of the physical is true, then physical events have physical

causes, and if mental events also causally cause physical ones, then they must supervene on the physical. Also, given the over-reliance on introspection, if it is shown to be an unreliable source of knowledge about consciousness, then many of the arguments about the non-physicalist nature of consciousness will lose their force. Physicalism is built on the methodology of naturalism, which allows it to fit scientific data.

There are three main arguments against physicalism in general. One of the most important arguments is the conceivability argument, or the zombie argument. According to this argument, if we believe that physicalism is true, then everything that exists is physical or derived from the physical, which means that if there is a world in which all physical properties and relations are duplicated, then all other properties of this world will be the same as at the original. If it is possible to imagine the existence of a world in which the entire physical structure is the same, and there are no properties of consciousness, then consciousness is not rooted, not derived from the physical.

The second argument suggests that there are qualitative properties of mental states that a person could not have known about before actually experiencing this kind, no matter how much knowledge he had about the physical and functional properties of the brain and nervous system. Philosopher F. Jackson proposed a thought experiment called Mary's Room [15].

He suggests introducing color scientist Mary. She studied the neurophysiology of color all her life, being in a black-and-white room, through a black-and-white monitor. At the same time, Mary has studied color so well that she knows all the information about color that can be obtained. She knows the wavelengths of all colors, knows exactly which neurons transmit a signal from the retina to the brain, and what happens at that time in the brain itself. Jackson claimed that when she went out into the real world, Mary would learn something qualitatively new.

The third argument states that no physical or functional characterization of sensations or perceptions can adequately explain why someone feels the way

they feel, and that such a gap in explanation casts doubt on the identity of the properties in question. The American philosopher Thomas Nagel, in his famous thought experiment, invites you to ask yourself the question “what is it like to be a bat?” [20]. His conclusion was that we can't say anything about what it is, so we only know about mental properties because we have them, and they are inevitably subjective. The conclusion from the first two arguments is that qualia cannot be identical with physical or functional properties, and the conclusion from the third argument is that there is at least no reason to believe that such identifications are correct.

Anti-physicalist strategies. The main anti-physicalist strategies fall into two groups: monistic and dualistic. Dualism is a representation of the heterogeneity of naturalistic ontology. Monistic strategies, in turn, proceed from the idea of homogeneity, homogeneity of naturalistic ontology. Thus there are not several fundamental natures, she is one, and in turn does not have to be a physicalist.

Dualistic strategies. The main directions in the dualistic approach are: substantial dualism, emergent dualism, epiphenomenalism, as well as property dualism or two-aspect theories. In its original and most radical formulation, dualism is the notion that consciousness and body (or matter) are fundamentally different kinds of substances or nature. This version of dualism, often called substance dualism, implies that mind and body are not only different in meaning, but are actually different kinds of entities.

The author of the theory of emergent dualism is W. Husker. Its main idea is that although consciousness (soul) is an immaterial substance, as substance dualism claims, it is still the result of evolution and arises on the basis of the physical due to the laws of nature. Emergence implies that when material particles reach a certain rather complex level of organization, they, like a system, have new, emergent properties that are not inherent in the elements of the system separately. According to Husker, since emergent properties have a special nature, different from the nature of the system, they may well be called intangible [14]. In addition, he argues that after its emergence, a new emergent entity is

capable of independent existence and in the absence of material forces that contribute to its emergence.

Epiphenomenalism is based on the fact that mental phenomena are epiphenomena, i.e. may be a consequence of physical processes, but cannot be their causes. Thus, accepting the statement of classical dualism about the difference between the mental and the physical, epiphenomenalism tries to explain the interaction of consciousness and body. Epiphenomenalists consider phenomenal properties as an inert appendage to physical ones.

The main argument against this approach is the so-called evolutionary argument. Its essence is as follows: an evolutionary premise is accepted, i.e. all the properties of living organisms, and in particular man, have undergone evolutionary selection and have evolutionary significance. Thus, consciousness, as one of the properties of a person, also passed the selection, which means that it is significant for survival and can influence behavior. The argument thus points to a contradiction in the causal role of consciousness, rejecting the epiphenomenalist thesis. The main problem with these theories is that they do not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of mental causality, or explain it unsatisfactorily, as is the case with epiphenomenalism. Property dualism and dual-aspect theories state that although the world is made up of nothing but the physical, there are two distinct kinds of properties: mental and physical. Thus, there are non-physical properties that supervene on the brain, i.e. dependent on the brain, and are secondary to the physical properties of the brain.

Monistic strategies. Panpsychism is the monistic thesis that consciousness is fundamentally rooted in reality. This means that the world at a fundamental level is not only physical relationships and properties, but also some microconscious or protoconscious properties. Thus the concept of the physical world is expanded and consciousness is presented as something fundamental, thus panpsychism solves the problem of mental causality at the same time combined with anti-physicalist arguments. The two main types of panpsychist ontology are constitutive and emergent. There are also monistic idealistic theories that claim

that consciousness is primary. They argue that matter is generated by some ideal forms, for example, human consciousness or God. At the moment, these positions are poorly represented, and mainly some representatives of religious philosophy are its supporters.

"Other" strategies. The main examples of "Other" strategies are: local interactionism, neutral monism, informational strategies. Local interactionism, the theory of which V. Vasiliev adheres to, is largely connected, among other things, with the acceptance of the transcendental status of consciousness [1].

Neutral monism is the position that, at a fundamental level, nature is neither physical nor mental, it is neutral. Mental and physical are only ways of describing the same third, neutral kind of substance. Neutral monism is strongly associated with panpsychism in the sense that, without rejecting the anti-physicalist argument, the very notion of the physical is rethought.

Information theories of consciousness are neither fully physicalist nor anti-physicalist, because they require clarification of what is meant by the concept of consciousness. After all, when defining consciousness or mental states as certain information processes that are ontologically neutral, it is not entirely clear what kind of solution to the mind-body problem is in question.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that the problem of consciousness-body is extremely complex, its solution is not a solution to a particular scientific problem, it will not give a recipe, a law, or some kind of technology, but consists in developing a model of the relationship between mental and physical phenomena. At the moment, the most promising models for explaining consciousness are physicalistic non-reductive models. The choice of a certain ontology in the mind-body problem determines how deep one needs to go into the matter of the brain in the "search" for consciousness, the analysis of strategies and their selection allow one to more accurately understand which of them can be accepted as working theories, candidates for real ones.

The conducted research allows us to look at the philosophy of consciousness as a multifaceted, differentiated area of philosophy, which closely enters into a dialogue with specialists from various scientific fields.

The paper formulates and classifies the main strategies for solving the mind-body problem, analyzes the main arguments for or against this or that theory. The proposed classification allows you to build a hierarchy of concepts, highlight their commonality and differences, as well as identify their relationship. Consciousness continues to be somewhat of a mystery to science, but nevertheless, in recent years, large-scale projects for the scientific study of consciousness have begun to unfold, which makes the relevance of the philosophy of consciousness indisputable. The development of technology, data science, machine learning, neural networks, artificial intelligence leads to the fact that not only scientists, but also people whose professional activities are in no way connected with it, begin to take an active interest in the problem of consciousness, because the problem of consciousness and related areas already become part of our daily lives.

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